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          1.0   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In almost all of the thirty reports it has published since “The Limits of Growth 
(1972)”, the authors (Club of Rome) do not only describe and analyse the complex 
problems facing the world (world problematic), they are essentially keen to offer 
protections which point to constructive paths into the future (world resolution).   
Hence, there can be no doubt that ‘globalization’ has become one of the trendiest 
words in fashion as our millennium comes to an end.  It is pertinent to note that this 
phrase does not reflect an inevitable natural phenomenon but, rather, is indicative of a 
process which has to be structured on any number of differing levels.  Thus, our main 
concerns will be to deal with on the global level, two long-term goals of equal 
importance:  Environmental sustainability and Socio-economic equality.  These goals 
often stand in contradiction to each other but strategically seen, they are nevertheless 
interdependent.  A partial or total arenunciation of any one of these goals would 
endanger achieving any of the others. 
 
Globalization, then, is a process which has to be structured quickly and in a positive 
way.  If this is to be systematically achieved, the population of the world will have to 
assume a high degree of responsibility for a common future.  Humanity’s future will 
only be secured if our intercourse with nature becomes more respectful, sparing, and 
sustainable.  This will require not only all of our efforts to make use of technical 
advances to increase efficiency, but will also demand that we develop new sustainable 
life-styles which, at least, in part will require some material renunciation.  It is against 
this background that the rest of this paper is divided into five sections.  Section two 
looks at the concept of globalization.  The inequality and unsustainability problems 
are respectively the focus of sections three and four.  The digitalization process as a 
global solution is presented in section five while section six concludes the paper. 
 
 
        2.0   GLOBALIZATION 
 
Indeed, globalization is not new, but the present era has distinctive features.   
Shrinking space, shrinking time and disappearing borders are linking people’s lives 
more intensely, more immediately than ever before.  That is, people everywhere are 
becoming connected – affected by events in far corners of the world.  Here, we have 
new markets (Foreign Exchange and Capital Markets linked globally, operating 24 
hours a day, with dealings at a distance in real time); new tools (Internet links, 
Cellular phones, Media networks); and new actors (the world trade organization with 
authority over national governments, the multinational corporations with more 
economic power than many states, the global networks of non-governmental 
organizations and other groups that transcend national boundaries); and new rules 
(multilateral agreements on trade, services and intellectual property, backed by strong 
enforcement mechanisms and more binding for national governments, reducing the 
scope for national policy).  The challenge of globalization in the new century is not to 
stop the expansion of global markets but to find the rules and institutions for stronger 
governance–local, national, regional and global–to preserve the advantages of global 
markets and competitions; and also to provide enough space for human, community 
and environmental resources to ensure that globalization works for people (UNDP, 
1999).  
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In this sense, globalization is shaping a new era of interaction among nations, 
economies and people.  It is increasing the contacts between people across national 
boundaries – in economy, in technology, in culture and in governance.  But it is also 
fragmenting production processes, labour markets, political entities and societies.  So, 
while globalization has positive, innovative, dynamic aspects - it also has negative, 
disruptive, marginalizing aspects.  Today’s interactions between nations and people 
are deeper than ever as shown by global trends and links in table 2.1 (See the 
appendix for variables description).  During this global integration are policy shifts to 
promote economic efficiency through the liberalization and deregulation of national 
markets and the retreat of the state from many economic activities, including the 
restructuring of the welfare state.  Driving integration even faster are the recent 
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LOW INCOME 



















MIDDLE INCOME  410,520  953,662  57,320  230,847  381,036  1,018,458 
LOWER MIDDLE
INCOME 
- 239,691  27,570  101,056  205,214  370,345 
UPPER MIDDLE
INCOME 
225,563 622,99 30,088  130,233 184,578  647,211 
LOW & MIDDLE
INCOME 
493,984 1,288,084 68,072 282,785  482,412  1,313,145 
EAST ASIA &PACIFIC  97,271  537,234  12,292  105,518  101,854  411,054 
EUROPE & CENTRAL
ASIA 
 249,450  -  77,726  -  309,720 
LATIN AMERICA &
CARIB 
99,355 270,876  14,268  44,471  74,429  337,406 
MID EAST & N. AFRICA  118,705  103,782  14,926  30,412  123,259  113,156 
SOUTH ASIA  14,868  50,743  4,457  12,396  25,032  67,304 
SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
49,231 84,706 6,603  13,026  51,878  86,534 
HIGH INCOME  1,274,830  4,124,433  288,345 1,043,005  1,278,838  4,040,845 
 
TABLE 2.1 GLOBAL TRADE LINKS    SOURCE:  WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT 
REPORTS 
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1983         1997 
 
1990        1997 
 
1990            1997 
WORLD  377,843  1,307,618  -  -  129,662    400,394 
LOW INCOME   21,228       85,092  14,819   88,685      5,732      59,509 
EXCL. CHINA & INDIA   17,369       44,337    4,840   19,551      2,083      11,922 
MIDDLE INCOME   87,836     247,297    28,091 210,049    18,697   103,780 
LOWER MIDDLE
INCOME 
 35,868     103,897  -  -  -  - 
UPPER MIDDLE
INCOME 
 51,234    143,661  -  -  -  - 
LOW & MIDDLE
INCOME 
108,707    332,063    42,910  298,73   24,429    163,295 
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC    17,773   128,602    18,720  104,257   11,135     64,284 
EUROPE & CENTRAL
ASIA 
-     59,655      7,695    49,875     1,097     22,314 
LATIN AMERICA &
CARIB. 
 21,329     63,390    12,411  118,91    8,188    16,573 
MID. EAST & N.
AFRICA  
 38,488    36,039         622      7,899    2,711      5,240 
SOUTH ASIA     5,329    17,494      2,174   11,110       464      4,662 
SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 14,347    25,133      1,288     6,674       834      5,222 
HIGH INCOME  271,116  977,279  -  -  168,233  237,099 
  
TABLE 2.1 (CONTD)  
 
very partial since the flow of labor is restricted, with borders closed to the unskilled.  
However, the world today has more opportunities for people than hundred years ago.  
Child death rates have fallen by half and a child born today can expect to live a 
decade longer than a child born then.  In developing countries, the combined primary 
and secondary enrolment ratio has more than doubled - and the proportion of children 
in primary school has risen and form less than half to more than three-quarters.  Also, 
adult literacy rates have risen and more states are now independent with more than 
seventy percent of the world’s people living under fairly pluralist democratic regimes.  
But these trends make great unevenness in the advances and in the new setbacks.  
Despite the tremendous progress in the 20
th century, the world today faces huge 
backlogs of deprivation and inequality that leave huge disparities within counties and 
regions.   
 
Global governance therefore is the framework of rules, institutions and practices that 
set limits on the behaviour of individuals, organizations and companies; and hence the 
intergovernmental policy - making in today’s global economy is in the hands of the 
major industrial powers and international institutions they control (The world Bank, 
International Monetary fund, and the Bank for international settlements).  
 
Their rule-making may create a secure environment for open markets, but there are no 
countervailing rules to protect human rights and promote human development.  More 
so, ad-hoc and self-selected policy groups have emerged in the past decade to make 
de facto global economic policy, outside the United Nations or any other format  
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system with democratic processes and participation.  Some of these groupings 
includes G-7, G-22,  G-15, and G-10.  All these groups play a key part in international 
economic policy-making, yet only the G-22 has any consultation with developing 
countries, and then only with a select few. And yet, one big development in opening 
opportunities for people to participate in global governance has been the growing 
strength and influence of NGOs.  They have been effective advocates for human 
development, maintaining pressure on national governments, international agencies 
and corporations to live up to commitments. 
 
 
3.0  INEQUALITIES (INSECURITIES) 
 
Indeed, globalization has its winners and its losers.  With the expansion of trade and 
foreign investment, developing countries have seen the gaps among themselves 
widen.  Meanwhile, in many industrial countries, unemployment has soared to levels 
not seen since 1930s, and income inequality to levels not recorded since the last 
century.  This picture is clearer by looking at the parameters of global 
inequalities/insecurities in Table 3.1 (see appendix for variable description).  In-fact, 
uneven globalization will bring not only integration but also fragmentation – dividing 
communities, nations and regions into those that are integrated and those that are 
excluded.  Again, Social tensions and conflicts are ignited when there are extremes of 
inequality between the marginal and the powerful.  Research on complex 
humanitarian emergencies have revealed that “horizontal inequalities” between 
groups - whether ethnic, religions or social groups are the major cause of the current 
wave of civil conflicts.  Inequalities (insecurities) matter not only in incomes but in 
political participation (in parliaments, cabinet, armies and local governments), in 
economic assets (inland, human capital and communal resources), in social conditions 
(in education, housing and employment).  Again in most countries, dislocations from 
economic and corporate restructuring and dismantled social protection have meant 























































1,534 0.463  0.454  40.6  522 
4. ARAB STATE  4,094  0.626  0.609  32.4  1,754 









AND THE  
PACIFIC 
3,697 0.695  0.692  25.0  1,556 
















AND THE CIS 





23,741 0.919  0.915  13.5  27,174 
 WORLD  6,332  0.706 
  0.700 -  5,257 
 
TABLE 3.1 PARAMETERS OF GLOBAL INEQUALITY (INSECURITY)    SOURCE: 








Cont. from  page 8 at the end of the last column  
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TOTAL ODA 




AS % OF GNP 
EXTERNAL DEBT (US 
$ MILLIONS) 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT AS % OF 
GNP 
1991 1997  1991  1997 1985  1997  1985  1997 
47,918 34,469  1.9  0.9  915,690.6  2,001,755.0  39.9 36.0 
15,136 13,041  13.4  11.1 71,411.0  134,713.2  62.4 92.3 
15,658 13,726  123  6.7 95,328.2  198,224.2  74.0 66.3 
10,360 4,807  4.0  -  138,570.0  201,196.9  41.6  45.7 
2,160 2,136  0.3  0.1  71,281.3  290,787.4  18.0  22.0 
161 96  - -  54,585.3  144,090.4  59.9  32.9 
5,189 4,152  1.4  0.5  107,596.7  356,228.2  56.2  61.3 
7,642 4,335  1.9  0.7  68,024.1  161,295.8  15.8  25.7 
4,897 2,657  5.2  1.9  27,073.4  66,891.6  12.8  26.8 
5,246 5,265  0.5  0.5  408,877.7  702,817.1  58.3  33.9 
5,697 4,272  0.4  0.4  -  284,564.4 -  30.5 
- -  -  - -  -  -   
- -  -  - -  -  -    
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 Cont. from the last column of page 9 
FEMALE ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY RATE  REFUGEES  SUICIDES  100, 




































1985 1997 1997 2015 1997 1997  1997  1997  1997  1990-95 1990-95     
28.7 18.4  62.5 50.7  39.3  111.3  68.0  7,669.6  -  -  -  238.8  0.3798
20.5  12.4  84.8  70.8 41.1 99.7  76.5  2,749.1  2,704.5  -  -  204.4  0.2814
25.2  13.7  91.4  77.6 37.8 97.7  73.9  2,770.0  2,005.4  -  -  -  - 
- -  74.3  57.4  19.2  123.7  38.6  763.3    -  -  -  - 
18.5  8.6  47.5  40.6  55.1  114.2  86.6 292.7 119.8  -  -  -  - 
27.8 8.6  41.2  41.1  41.2  126.1 69.7    -  -  -  -  - 
30.5 14.7  60.0 45.8  41.7  118.6  74.1  -  -  -  -  -  - 
15.8  19.9  68.1  49.8 29.1 99.4  51.7  3,559.2    -  -  -  - 
10.9 20.5  76.5 55.8  29.5  114.2 55.9 3,336.1  300.6  -  -  -  - 
38.1 35.6  61.5 50.2  28.8  140.0  51.3  83.2  -  -  -  -  - 
-  9.8  51.2  44.7 45.6 97.3  82.4  835.0  1,069.4  51.9  10.5  225.7  0.5767
-  - 49.7  52.7  41.9  119.4 72.6  2,753.3   19.5  5.7  233.4  0.4513
-  -  59.6  50.6  40.2  111.3  69.8  11,975.5       
 
 
(THE END OF)   TABLE 3.1   PARAMETERS OF GLOBAL INEQUALITY 




and worsening employment conditions.  Jobs and incomes have become more 
precarious.  Again, the pressures of global competition have led countries and 
employers to adopt more flexible labour policies, and work arrangements with 
no long-term commitment between employer and employee are on the rise. 
 
Indeed, globalization opens many opportunities for crime, and is rapidly 
becoming global out-pacing international cooperation to fight it.  Today, there 
are many drug users, threatening neighbourhoods around the world.  Illegal 
trafficking in weapons is a growing business - destabilizing societies and 
governments, arming conflicts in some continents.  Another thriving industry 
is the illegal trafficking in women and girls for sexual exploitation, a form of 
slavery and an inconceivable violation of human rights.  Here women lose not 
only their freedom, but their dignity and often their health if they return to 
their homes, they are often rejected by their families and communities.  At the 
heart of all, this is the growing power and influence of organized crime 
syndicates.  The sheer concentration of their power and money criminalizes 
business, politics and government.  All have operations extending beyond 
national borders, and they are now developing strategic alliances linked in a 
global network, reaping the benefits of globalization.  Again, Civil Conflicts 
have been flaring for decades.  But what’s new today is the complex 
interaction of interests, the blurred line between conflicts and business.   
Defence is becoming privatized, and international private military firms are  
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proliferating.  Accountable only to those who pay, such businesses are hard to 
regulate and so far domestic and international laws seeking to limit mercenary 





4.0  UNSUSTAINABILITY 
   
At the end of the 20
th Century, environmental problems are a matter of both 
national and global concerns.  Many of them create spillovers that impose 
heavy costs not only on those close to the source of the problem but on society 
as a whole and on future generations.  Individual countries have strong 
economic and social reasons for aggressively protecting their environments by 
creating incentives to reduce and manage such spillovers.  Yet, an important 
subset of environmental problems is global in scope.  Many counties have 
contributed to these problems, and no individual country can effectively 
address them by acting alone.  These are the problems of the “global 
commons”, which will place all countries at risk if no collective action is 
taken.  There are many such issues, including desertification, persistent 
organic pollutants, the fate of Antarctica, and the environmental health of the 
high seas and the seabed. 
 
However,  biodiversity destruction and climate change are two pressing 
problems in the global environmental agenda.  Table 4.1 (Global 
environmental problem) reports the current state of these problems (with 
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TABLE 4.1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS     




Indeed,  economic activity is the driving force of climate change and 
biodiversity destruction.  Both originate in current pattern of consumption and 
resource use.  As shown in the Table 4.1, the economic activity of industrial 
nations which house less than 20 per cent of the world population originates 
greater percent of global emissions of carbon-dioxide that could potentially 
change the global climate.  The destruction of forest ecosystems that 
accompanies industrialization is believed to be the main source of global 
biodiversity loss.  Thus, fossil fuels and forest destruction are at the root of the 
global environmental problems.  Industrial society depends on fossil fuels, and 
industrialization has led to most of the destruction of the world’s forests in 
contemporary society.  From this perspective, without changing industrial 
countries’ patterns of consumption, and resource use, there would be no 
solution to the world’s global environmental problems. 
 
Yet, the contribution of developing countries is more ambiguous and complex.  
Many developing countries are embarked on, and aspire to their own process 
of industrialization.  If, however, they were to replicate the pattern of resource 
use of industrial countries, fifty years from now they could become the major 
source of global environmental damage: this could spell disaster.  Again, the 
developing countries are the source of most exports of natural resources used 
in the world.  Here, industrial countries extensive use of resources are 
associated with resource – intensive patterns of economic growth in may 



















































1980 1996  1980  1996  1996  1996  1995  1980 1996 
WORLD  101,724 0.3  8,542.7 6.6  13,640.7  22.653.9 3.4 4.0  62 93.8  41.78  3.1  3.2 
LOW  INCOME  49,332  0.7 2,439.4  5.9 2,126.1 5,051.8 0.9 1.5  72 0.4  - -  - 
EXCL. CHINA & INDIA  -  -  -  -  302.0  690.9  0.4 0.6  - -  -  -  0.8 
MIDDLE  INCOME  64,086  0.3 2,809.9  4.8 2,804.5 6,871.5 3.3 4.8  69 36.0  41.25  2.4  1.7 
LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
21,162  0.2 1,563.6  4.3 1,150.1 4,194.9 2.6 4.8  72 -  -  1.7  1.0 
UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
42,924  0.5 1,246.3  5.7 1,654.4 2,676.6 4.0 4.7  61 -  -  2.8  2.6 
LOW & MIDDLE 
INCOME 
113,418  0.4 5,249.3  5.3 4,930.6 11,923.
3 
1.5 2.5  69 36.4  41.25  1.4  1.3 
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC  29,956  0.8  1,102.2  6.9  1,958.5  4,717.5  1.4 2.7  81 -  -  -  - 
EUROPE & CENTRAL 
ASIA 
-5,798  -0.1 768.0 3.2 886.9  3,412.7  -  7.4  68 -  -  -  0.8 
LATIN AMERICAN % 
CARABEANS 
57,766 0.6  1,456.3 7.3 848.5  1,209.1  2.4 2.5  32 -  -  3.5  3.2 
MID. EAST & N. AFRICA  800  0.9  242.0  2.2  493.6  986.9  3.0 3.9  93 -  -  2.2  1.6 
SOUTH  ASIA  1,316 0.2 213.0 4.5 392.4  1,125.1  0.4 0.9  79 -  -  0.7  0.9 
SUB-SAHARA  AFRICA  29,378 0.7  1,467.8 6.2 350.7 472.1  0.9 0.8  79 -  -  -  - 
HIGH INCOME  -11,694 -0.2 3,2934 10.8  8,710.2  10.730.6  12.3 12.
3 
58  43.8 42.31  4.1  5.0  
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rule fifty years ago.  The situation has been summarized as the developing 
countries over-exploitation of resources which are exported and over-
consumed in the industrial countries. 
 
As evidence about the potential seriousness of the effects of climate change 
has mounted, attention has focused on the likely costs of different policies to 
slow or halt the change.  Numerous studies have investigated the possibilities 
of reducing the emissions of green house gasses, the cause of global warming, 
with most attention being focused on CO2, the most important greenhouse gas 
and various economic models have been developed to examine the likely cost 
of reducing such emissions (See Nwaobi, 1997).  These models have mostly 
concentrated on man-made emissions of CO2, which arise almost entirely from 
the burning of fossil fuels, so that energy–sector detail has been of importance.  
There have already been several surveys of these model results (Howeller et 
al., 1991; Boero et al., 1991 and Cline, 1992).  But each of these surveys has 
been confronted with the problem of trying to compare like with like, the 
model results generally being for a variety of different time periods, key 
baseline assumptions, reduction scenarios and so on.  Even with a 
standardization of assumptions on growth, population and resources, the ball 
emission paths vary greatly across the models.  This is already a point of 
concern since the costs of achieving any target level for emissions such as the 
stabilization at 1990 levels, depend critically on the nature of the baseline 
(what “distance” does one need to cut).  In such “target” cases, it is not only 
the absolute tons of carbons that will vary across models but also the 
proportionate cut.  The CO2, emission paths in the ball scenario are shown in 
Table 4.2 
BILLION TONS OF CARBON 




IEA**  MR (1)  MR (2)  WW 




2000  6.931  -  - 7.071 7.418  7.316 6.970 6.748   
2005  -  6.709  7.856 7.704 8.250  7.932  -  -   
2010  8.031  -  - 8.705 9.452  - 8,153 7.581   
2020  9.327  8.180  10.505 10.806 11.938  -  9.520  8.681   
2050  11.337  11.838  17.606 18.998 21.769  - 14.992 11.356   
2080  23.519  18.099  32.185 - -  -  26.945  18.701   
2100  35.863  22.578*  41.594* - -  -  39.636  26.039  65.5 
 






**  The IEA model projections in this table have been adjusted to exclude non-
fossil solid fuels, bunkers, non-energy use of fossil fuels and petrochemical 
feed stocks.  These categories included in the standard IEA model output have 
not been excluded from the tables in the appendix or from the result reported  
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in the IEA paper and add around 900 million tons to the 1990 global figures of 
carbon emissions. 
 
***  In the three cases (ERM, MR, GREEN) where two emission paths are 
indicated, the first column denotes the standard model and the second column 
shows the sensitivity to a different assumption on the autonomous energy 
efficiency improvement (AEEI). ERM (I), GREEN (1) and MR (2) have an 
AEEI of 1 per cent per annum while ERM (2), GREEN (2) and MR (1) have 
an AEEI of ½ percent per annum. 
 
****  CRTM is the carbon Rights Trade Model (See Rutherford, 1992); ERM is the 
Edmonds–Reilly Model (See Barns et al, 1992); GREEN is the OECD Model 
(See Oliveira Matins et al, 1992); IEA is the International Energy Agency 
Model (See Vouyoukas, 1992); MR is the Mane-Richels Global 2100 Model 
(See Mane, 1992) and WW is the Whalley-Wigle Model (See Whalley and 
Wigle, 1992) 
 
  Here, there are some differences in the starting point for energy–related CO2 
emissions in 1990, ranging from 5.8 billion tons of carbon (GREEN WW 
ERM) to 6.0 billion tons (CRTM and MR).  This initial difference of 3 percent 
is not trivial, but it is also not surprising given that 1990 data are estimates 
based on data on energy consumption in earlier years and the application of 
“carbon emission coefficients” for different categories of fuel.  In fact, the 
difference in 1990 level of emissions look relatively small when compared 
with the divergences in CO2 emissions that open up, even in the short-term 
(for the world). 
 
  In table 4.2, world emissions grow rather more rapidly over the short to 
medium – term in GREEN and IEA than in the other models.  ERM shows the 
slowest emission growth.  Up to 2020, emissions in GREEN are growing by 
up to ½ per cent per annum faster than in ERM, despite the assumption of the 
same autonomous energy efficiency improvement of 1 per cent per annum.  
Hence a gap of over 1½ billion tons of carbon opens up by 2020 between the 
top and bottom of the range of models, the 10.8 billion tons or GREEN and 
the 8.2 billion tons of ERM.  But looking beyond 2020, where it is possible to 
make direct comparisons of time paths for only CRTM, ERM, MR and 
GREEN (up to 2050), the divergent emissions parts for only CRTM, ERM, 
MR and GREEN (up to 2050), the divergent emission part for the earlier 
period open up much further. Of course, what may look to be relatively small 
differences in annual growth rates of CO2 emissions compound over a century 
into significant differences in terms of levels.  The average growth rate of 
emissions over the whole of the period 1990-2100 is 1.3 per cent in ERM, 1.6 
per cent in CRTM and 1.7 per cent in MR. But the spread between the lowest 
and highest emissions in 2100-22 ½ billion tons of carbon in ERM and 39 ½ 
billion tons in MR is quite startling.  WW have a point estimate for 2100 of 65 
½ billion tons but this seems to reflect both an extremely pessimistic 
assessment of energy efficiency improvements and the lack of substitution 
possibilities imposed by the two fuel structure of the model.  Thus, the 
importance of the autonomous energy efficiency parameter (AEEI) in 
contributing to the large differences in emissions has been revealed by some  
  12 
sensitivity testing.  In an alternative BAU scenario, using ERM but reducing 
AEEI from 1 percent per annum to ½ percent in all regions, world emissions 
rise from the previous 22 ½ billion tons to around 42 billion tons by the end of 
the next century, much in line with the MR results.  A similar exercise with 
MR, this time increasing its AEEI to 1 per cent per annum in all regions, leads 
to emissions in 2100 of 26 billion tons, much closer to the standard ERM 
result of 22 ½ billion tons.  On the other hand, imposing a lower AEEI of ½ 
per cent in GREEN takes the 2050 emission to a higher level (21.8 billion tons 
compared with 19 billion tons using the standard model with a 1 percent 
AEEI) 
 
  It is therefore very evident that the world faces a major challenge: to find 
practical paths for sustainable development.  This means finding ways to 
reorient consumption patterns and use of natural resources in ways that 
improve the equality of human life, while living within the carrying capacity 
of supporting ecosystems.  It requires building economic systems where basic 
needs are satisfied across the world, while protecting resources and 
ecosystems so as not to deprive the people of the future from satisfying their 
needs.  It also requires building a future in which humans live in harmony 
with nature and we are far from this goal.  Indeed, in many ways, the world 
economy is moving in the opposite direction and the task is daunting. 
 
 
5.0   DIGITALIZATION 
 
Digital technology describes not only the digitalization of communication but 
an entire plethora of new processes and instruments.  A decisive role in all this 
was played by the microelectronic revolution at the beginning of the 1980s, 
as well as modern satellite technology and fibre optic cables.  All of these 
things have produced a wide range of new products: mobile telephones, e-
books, pagers, players, notebooks, recorders, and so on.  These discoveries are 
consequently leading to what might be called the knowledge revolution.  
Here, an important input is knowledge rather than information.  This is 
basically the difference between the computer industry, which is based on 
Information Technology, and other sectors such as telecommunication, 
biotechnology and nano technology, which involve knowledge.  In other 
words, knowledge is the content while information is the medium.  Thus, the 
content is driving change, facilitated by the medium. 
 
A distinct possibility therefore, is that in the mid 21
st Century, a new society 
will develop, a society that is centered in human creativity and diversity, and 
which uses information technology rather than fossil fuels to power 
economic growth.  This vision is a human-centred society which is deeply 
innovative in terms of knowledge and at the same time very conservative in 
the use of natural resources.  The patterns of consumption and resources use 
may not be as voracious as those in the industrial society and may be better 
distributed across each society and across the globe.  This knowledge society 
may achieve economic progress that is harmonious with the nature.  This 
vision is distant and only a possibility at present.  Without developing the right 
institutions and incentives, this possibility may never come to pass, and a  
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historical opportunity may be lost.  Table 5.1 shows the current structure of 
information and communication technologies in the world (with the variable 
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286  1300  664 552 188 269.4  470.12  5,783  8,121  8  6 
 
TABLE 5.1 WORLD STRUCTURE OF INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
SOURCE: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 
 
To produce new knowledge, economic incentives are necessary.  This could 
involve restricting the use of the knowledge by others, so the creator can 
benefit.  Patents on new discoveries work in this fashion: by restricting the use 
of knowledge and this creates a problem.  Any restriction in the sharing of 
knowledge is inefficient, because knowledge could be shared at no cost and by 
doing so, it can better others.  So, restrictions on the use of knowledge are 
inefficient after knowledge is created.  However, without some restrictions 
there may be no incentive to create new knowledge and this could be called  
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the paradox of knowledge.  Here, the solution to the paradox could be a new 
system of property rights that can deal simultaneously with the need to share 
the use of knowledge for efficiency, while at the same time preserving private 
incentives for production.  These systems ensure and encourage widespread 
use of knowledge, while at the same time offering incentives to private 
individuals, the knowledge creators to produce new knowledge.  Specially, we 
propose substituting patents by a system of compulsory negotiable licences 
which are traded in the market competitive along with all other goods in the 
economy.  In this new scheme, the right to knowledge is unrestricted; 
however, users must pay the creator each time they use their knowledge.   
Since the license are traded in competitive markets, they ensure that the 
creators of knowledge are compensated for their labour in a way that reflects 
the demand for their products and therefore their usefulness for society. 
 
In this sense, It is pertinent to note that the newest technologies (computers, 
genetic engineering and nanotech) differ from the technology that preceded 
them in a fundamental way.  They are self-accelerating; that is the products of 
their own processes enable them to develop evermore rapidly.  New computer 
chips are immediately put to use developing the nest generation of more 
powerful ones; which is the inexorable acceleration expressed as Moor’s law.  
The same dynamic drives biotech and nanotech – even more so because all 
these technologies tend to accelerate one another.  Most recently, computers 
are rapidly mapping the DNA in human genome and now DNA is being 
explored as a medium for computation.  When nanobots are finally perfected, 
you can be sure that one of the first things they will do is make new and better 
nanobots.  Technologies with this property of perpetual self-accelerated 
development (autocatalysis) create conditions that are unstable, unpredictable 
and unreliable.  And since these particular autocatalytic technologies drive 
whole sectors of society, there is a risk that civilization itself may become 
unstable, unpredictable and unreliable.  In fact, the economic destiny and 
prosperity of entire nations may rest on one question: Can silicon based 
computer technology sustain Moore’s law beyond 2020?  The secret behind 
Moor’s law is that chip-makers double every eighteen months or so, the 
number of transistors can be crammed into a silicon water, the size of a finger 
nail.  They do this by etching microscopic grooves into crystalline silicon with 
beams of ultraviolet radiation.  A typical wire in a Pentium chip is now 1/500 
the width of a human hair,  The insulating layer is only 25 atoms thick.  But 
the laws of physics suggest that this doubling cannot be sustained forever.  
Eventually, transistors will become so-tiny that their silicon components will 
approach the size of molecules. A this credibly tiny distances, the bizarre rules 
of quantum mechanics take over permitting electrons to jump from one place 
to another without passing through the space between.  Hence electrons will 
spurt across atom-size wires and insulators, causing fatal short circuits.  More 
so, transistors components are fast approaching the dreaded point - one limit – 
when the width of transistor components reaches 0.1 microns and their 
insulating layers are only a few atoms thick.  Recently, some scientists have 
therefore sounded an alarm warning that Moor’s law could collapse and that 
there are currently no known solutions to these problems. 
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However, the search for a successor to silicon has become a kind of crusade; it 
is the Holy Grail of computation.  Among physicists, the race to create the 
Silicon Valley for the next century has already begun and some of the 
theoretical options are explored.  The optical computer replaces electricity 
with laser light beams.  Unlike wires, light beams can pass through one 
another, making possible three-dimensional microprocessors.  Thus, the 
optical counterpart of a desktop computer would be the size of a car.  Again, 
one of the most indigenous ideas being pursued is to compute using DNA, 
treating the double-standard molecules as a kind of biological computer take 
(except that instead of encoding 0s and 1s in binary, it uses the four nucleic 
acids, represented by A,T.C,G).  This approach holds much promise for 
crunching big numbers.  Hence large banks and institutions may one day use 
it.  However, DNA computer is an unwiedly contraption, consisting of a 
jungle of tubes of organic liquid, and is unlikely to replace a laptop in the near 
future.  Other exotic designs include the molecular computer and the quantum 
dot computer (which replace the silicon transistor with a single molecule and a 
single electron respectively).  But these approaches face formidable technical 
problems, such as mass-producing atomic wires and insulators; and a viable 
prototypes yet exist.  The darkest horse to emerge in this race is the quantum 
computer, sometimes dubbed the ultimate computer.  The idea is to direct a 
laser or radio beam on a carefully arranged collection of atomic nuclei, each of 
which is spinning like a top.  As the beam bounces off the atoms  it flips the 
spines of some of them and complex computations can be performed by 
analyzing how the spins have been flipped. 
 
Clearly, none of these designs are ready for prime time.  Most are still on the 
drawing board and even those with working prototypes are too crude to rival 
the convenience and efficiency of silicon.  There may be a silver lining to all 
this.  If Moor’s law somehow continues unbated, then by some estimates, our 
computers by 2050 will be calculating well beyond 500 trillion bytes per 
seconds (per/secs.), at which point, they will be considerably smarter than we 
are.  In other words, there are still room for creativity and designers are still 
going to have to think.  Computers will become a lot more transparent and you 
won’t recognize you are using one.  People with little education are going to 
be able to participate and the digital division is going to disappear. 
 
For the future of the internet, most access will probably be via high-speed, 
low-power radio links.  Most hand held, fixed and mobile appliances will be 
internet enabled. This trend is already discernable in the form of internet-
enabled mobile telephones and personal digital assistants (PDA) equipped 
with radio links, APDA can serve as an appliance-control remote, a digital 
wallet, a cell phone, an identity badge, an e-mail station, a digital book, a 
paper and perhaps even a digital camera perhaps.  This could be called 
Wireless Internet Digital Gadget for Electronic Transactions, (WIDGET).   
Again, so many appliances, vehicles and buildings will be on-line by 2020 that 
it seems likely there will be more things on the Internet than people.  Internet-
enabled cars and airplanes are coming on-line, and smart houses are being 
built everyday.  Eventually, programmable devices will become so cheap that 
we will embed them in the cardboard boxes and these passive “computers” 
will be activated as the pass sensors and will be able to both emit and absorb  
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information.  Such innovations will facilitate increasingly automatic 
manufacturing, inventory control, shipping and distribution.  The advent of 
programmable, nanoscale machines will extend the Internet to things such as 
the size of molecules that can be injected under the skin, leading to Internet–
enabled people.  Such devices, together with Internet-enabled sensors 
embedded in clothing, will avoid a hospital stay for medical patients who 
would otherwise be there only for observation.  The Internet will also undergo 
substantial alteration as optical technologies allow the transmission of trillions 
of bits per seconds on each strand of the Internet’s fibre–optic backbone 
network.  The core of the network will remain optical, and the edges will use a 
mix of access technologies, ranging from radio and infrared to optical fibre 
and the old twisted-pair copper telephone lines.  Here, more and more of the 
world’s information will be accessible instantly and from virtually anywhere.  
In an emergency, our health records will be available for remote medical 
consultation with specialists and perhaps even remote surgery.  More and 
more devices will have access to the global positioning system (GPS) 
increasing the value of geographically indexed databases.  Using GPS with 
speech understanding software, we will be able to get directions from our 
WIDGETS.  However, in the face of the internet – wide virus attacks, is the 
realization that we will depend in larger and larger measure on the network’s 
functioning reliably - making this system of millions of networks sufficiently 
robust and resilient is a challenge for the present generation of Internet 
engineers (with an optimistic view of the future). 
 
Without the means to electronically evaluate data, future scientific research 
remains unthinkable, therefore scientists has recently announced the “source 
codes of homo sapiens” – an approximate reading of the chemical sequence of 
the human genome. This genome is all the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), that 
makes up an organism. Genes (over three billion) are apart of the complex 
biological process of making those  proteins, which determines how an 
organism looks, feels or behaves. This may spell the beginning of the biotech 
age, plus megabucks for biotech industries. But beyond the economics are the 
immense benefits this new discovery holds. For instance, in the area of 
molecular medicine, detailed genome maps have aided researchers to discover 
genes associated with various diseases. In such instances, doctors can now 
treat the actual causes of diseases rather than mere symptoms. In addition, 
diagnostic tests can be more specific medical researchers may also be able to 
produce genome specific drugs and there is the increased likelihood of 
improve gene therapy. Here, microbial genomic (understanding the genomes 
of microorganisms) could help in providing new energy sources (bio fuels), 
environmental monitoring to detect pollutants, protection from chemical and 
biological warfare and more efficient toxic waste clean-up. In addition, 
understanding the human genome will enable scientists to understand the 
effects of exposure to things like radiation and other energy–related agents. 
And yet, other benefits are in DNA forenics, agriculture, livestock breeding, 
bio-processing and the production of  “made to order” babies. It is however 
the later, more than anything else, that has been a subject of raging 
controversy and thus has been seen as tinkering with the Almighty God (Our 
Divine). Indeed, future developments along this line should be discouraged. 
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 6.0  CONCLUSION 
 
Indeed national action is essential to capture global opportunities in trade, 
capital flow and migration and to protect people against the uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities of globalization. But the success of national action hinges on 
how effectively countries can negotiate at the global level. Thus reinventing 
global governance is not an option but an imperative for the 21
ST Century. 
Global Competition and market efficiency are the big objectives of current 
efforts to restructure global economic governance. The latter need to 
incorporate human development priorities for people in all parts of the world 
(for poverty reduction, equity, sustainability and human development). Here, 
the institutions of global governance have leaned hard on national 
governments to adopt their preferred systems of social protection – marginal 
for the International Monetary fund, social safety nets for the World Bank and 
a broader and more pragmatic range of social policy options and mechanisms 
for other United Nation Agencies. 
 
But a broader, more coherent set of international principles is required - as 
some governments are beginning to recognize. Such agreements, carefully 
defined can raise living standards and protect the environment, without setting 
back employment or discouraging foreign investment. Collective regional 
action  can ensure that the decisions are based on the needs of people in the 
countries concerned. In other words, with the new challenges of globalization, 
and the need to ensure stronger action on old problems and new, the time has 
to come to rethink the global architecture. Some of the key element of the 
proposed international architecture are a stronger and more coherent UN 
system,with greater commitment from all countries; a global central bank; a 
world investment trust with re-distributive functions and transfer mechanism; 
a world environment agency; a revised world trade organization; an 
international criminal court and a broader United Nations. These new and 
stronger international institutions of global governance can be global public 
goods. At the national level, public goods have been recognized as vital when 
the market is neither the incentive not the mechanism to meet a public need. 
With growing globalization, international public goods are now needed for 
similar reasons. This new perspective is much more than a change of 
terminology. To recognize the need for global goods is to accept the 
importance of actions of global governance beyond the capacity of individual 
countries to provide, to establish a rationale for new forms of financial support 
that countries need to ensure but to recognize also that without special efforts 
such support may not be forthcoming. These issues become matters for 
political advocacy and education on globalization in which all countries have a 
role and a stake. 
 
Thus, just as countries need central banks, so the world needs a central bank in 
the 21
st century. The recent establishment of the European Central Bank 
demonstrates the perceived need among some of the richest industrial 
countries. A world central bank would therefore help stabilize global 
economic activity by performing several vital functions: acting as lender of 
resort; regulating financial institutions and flows; calming financial markets  
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when they become jittery or disorderly; and creating and regulating new 
international liquidity. Enlarging the mandate of the IMF would be one 
approach while another would be to establish a world financial authority.   
Keynes’ original proposal was that the global monetary authority should have 
access to resources equivalent to 50% of world imports.  The US counter-
proposal was for 15%.  Several mechanisms are available to expand the global 
financial resources, including a renewed issue of special drawing rights and 
agreements with the main central banks to permit enlarged swap 
arrangements.  Quick access to funding may be as important as the size of the 
resources available and procedures to achieve this need  to be explored such as 
advance agreement on provisional lines of credit.  In addition, there is an 
urgent need for new mechanisms to generate additional flows of resources to 
poor developing countries as well as new funding for global public goods. 
 
Indeed, relative to today’s global economy and the global challenge of 
sustainability, present structures and levels of global supports are minuscule.  
Needed is a world environment agency, possibly developed from UNEP, with 
much larger resources and broader functions.  These include to oversee the 
global environment presenting reports and posing issues for review and policy 
making; to broker deals and to serve as a clearing bank.  One important focus 
of that agency would be to encourage the removal of perverse subsidies and 
shift the resources released to direct support of environmental protection and 
other measures (including employment creation) for its cleaning house 
functions, the agency would oversee trade in permits for green house gas 
emissions, along the lines explored in the clean development mechanism 
proposed in the climate conferences.  Emission rights could be borrowed or 
lent, but not sold and thus keeping the market competitive and avoiding any 
risk that developing countries might lose long-term control over their rights.  
Also, the clearing house would be a new mechanism for mobilizing additional 
financial resources for developing countries, especially the poorest. 
 
Finally, the world is rushing headlong into greater integration that is driven 
mostly by economic forces and guided mostly by a philosophy of market 
profitability and economic efficiency.  People in all parts of the world need to 
join in the debate and to make clear their interests and concerns.  The process 
of reinventing global governance must be broader and human development 
can provide framework for this exploration. This piece therefore is our own 
contribution.    





1.  MECHANDISE EXPORTS 
Shows the F.O.B (Free On Board) value in U.S dollars, of goods provided to 
the rest of the world. 
 
2.  MECHANDISE IMPORTS 
Shows the C.I.F. (Cost plus Insurance and Freight) value, in US dollars, of 
goods purchased from the rest of the world 
 
3.  COMMERCIAL SERVICES 
Comprises all trade in services, including transportation, communication, and 
business, excluding government services, which comprise services associated 
with government sectors (such as expenditures on embassies and consulates) 
and with regional and international organizations. 
 
4.  NET PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS 
Consists of private debt and non-debt flows.  Private debt-flows include 
commercial bond, lending bonds, and other private credits, non-debt private 
flows are foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment. 
 
5.  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy 
other than that of the investor.  It is the sum of equity capital flows, and short-
term capital flows. 
 
6.  REAL GDP PER CAPITA (PPP$) 
Is the GDP per capita of a country converted into US dollars on the basis of 
the purchasing power parity exchange rate? 
 
7.  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI) 
This is based on three indicators: Longevity, as measured by life expectancy at 
birth; educational attainment as measured by a combination of adult literacy 
(two-third weight) and the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary 
enrolment ratio (one-third weight); and standard of living as measured by real 
GDP per capita (PPP$).  In other words, the HDI is a single average of the life 
expectancy index, educational attainment index and adjusted real GDP per 
capita (PPP$) index, and so is derived by dividing the sum of these three 
indices by three. 
 
8.  GENDER-RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX 
Uses the same variable as the HDI but the difference being that the FDI adjust 
the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational 
attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement 
between women and men.  For the gender-sensitive adjustment, they used 
weighting formula that expresses a moderate evasion to inequality, setting the 
weighting parameter, equal to 2, being the harmonic mean of the male and  
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female values.  The index also adjusts the maximum and minimum values for 
life expectancy to account for the fact that women tend to live longer than 
men.  For women, the maximum value is 87.5 years and the minimum value is 
27.5 years, for men the corresponding values are 82.5 and 22.5 years. 
 
9.  THE GENDER EMPOWERMENT MEASURE (GEM) 
Uses variables constructed explicitly to measure the relative empowerment of 
women and men in political and economic spheres of activity.  Here, the first 
two variables are chosen to reflect economic participation and decision-
making power: women’s and men’s percentage shares of professional and 
technical jobs.  These are broad, lovely defined occupational categories.   
Because the relevant population for each is different, calculates separate index 
for each and then add the two together.  The third variable, women’s and 
men’s percentage shares of parliamentary seats, is chosen to reflect political 
and decision-making power.  For all three of these variables, it uses the 
methodology of population – weighted (I-E) averaging to derive an “equally 
distributed equivalent percentage” (EDEP) for both sexes taken together and 
each variable is indexed by dividing the EDEP by 50%.  Again, an income 
variable is used to reflect power over economic resources and it is calculated 
in the same way as for the GDI except that unadjusted rather than adjusted real 
GDP per capita is used.  These three indices for economic participation and 
decision-making political participation and decision-making, and power over 
economic resources - are added together to derive the final GEM value. 
 
10.  THE HUMAN POVERTY INDEX 
Concentrates on deprivations in three essential dimensions of human life: 
Longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living.  The first deprivation 
relates to survival (vulnerability to death at a relatively early age).  The second 
relates to knowledge (being excluded from the world of reading and 
communication).  The third relates to a decent living standard in terms of 
overall economic provisioning.  Here, the deprivation in longevity is 
represented by the percentage of people not expected to survive to age 40 and 
the deprivation in knowledge by the percentage of adults who are illiterate.  
The deprivation in standard of living is represented by a composite of three 
variables (the percentage of people without access to safe water, the 
percentage of people without access to health services and the percentage of 
moderately and severely underweight children under five years.  However, the 
human poverty index for industrialized countries concentrates on deprivations 
in four dimensions of human life – Longevity, knowledge, a decent standard 
of living and social exclusion.  The first deprivation relates to survival 
vulnerability to death at a relatively early age).  The second relates to 
knowledge (being deprived of the world of reading and communication).  The 
third relates to a decent standard of living in terms of overall economic 
provisioning while the fourth relates to non-participation or exclusion.  Here, 
the deprivation in longevity is represented by the percentage of people not 
expected to survive to age 60 and the deprivation in knowledge by the 
percentage of people who are functionally illiterate as defined by the OECD.  
Again, the deprivation in standard of living is represented by the percentage of 
people living below the income poverty line while the fourth deprivation, in  
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non-participation or exclusion, is measured by the rate of long-term (12 
months or more) unemployment of the labour force. 
 
11.  OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) 
Grants or loans to countries or territories that are undertaken by the official 
sector, with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main 
objective, at concessional financial terms. 
 
12.  EXTERNAL DEBT 
Debt owed by a country to non-residents repayable in foreign currency, goods 
or services 
 
13.  DEPENDENCY RATIO 
The ratio of the population defined as dependent (those under 15 and above 
65) to the working age population (age 15-64). 
 
14.  REFUGEES 
People who have fled their countries because of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership in a particular social group, and who cannot or do not want to 
return. 
 
15.  CARBONDIOXIDE EMISSION 
Measures those emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the 
manufacture of cement.  These include carbon-dioxide produced during 
consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and from gas flaming. 
 
16.  GDP PER UNIT OF ENERGY USE 
Is the US dollar estimate of real gross domestic product (at 1995 prices) per 
kilogram of oil equivalent of commercial energy use. 
 
17.  ANNUAL DEFORESTATION 
This refers to the permanent conversion of forest area (land under natural or 
planted sands of trees) to other uses, including shifting cultivation, permanent 
agriculture, ranching, settlements, and infrastructure development.  Deforested 
areas do not include areas logged but intended for regeneration or areas 
degraded by fuel wood gathering, acid precipitation, or forest fires. 
 
18.  NATIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS 
This refers to the totally or partially protected areas of at least 1,000 hectares 
that are designated as national parks, natural monuments, nature reserves, 
wildlife sanctuaries, protected landscape and seascapes, or scientific reserves 
with limited public access. 
 
19.  SULPHUR DIOXIDE (SO2) EMISSIONS 
Emissions of sulphur in the form of sulphur oxides and of nitrogen in the form 
of its various oxides, which together contribute to acid rain and adversely 
affect agriculture, forests aquatic habitats and the weathering of building 
materials. 
  
  22 
20.  ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA 
Measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants 
less distribution losses and their own use. 
 
21.  ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION LOSSES 
Measure losses occurring between sources of supply and points of distribution, 
and in distribution to consumers, including pilferage. 
 
22.  DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
The number of copies distributed of newspapers published at least four times a 
week per thousand people. 
 
23.  RADIOS 
The estimated number of radio receivers in use for broadcasts to the general 
public, per thousand people. 
 
24.  TELEVISION SETS 
  The estimated number of television set in use, per thousand people. 
 
25.  TELEPHONE LINES 
Telephone main lines count all telephone lines that connect a customer’s 
equipment to the public switched telephone network, per thousand people. 
 
26.  MOBILE TELEPHONE 
This refers to users of portable telephones subscribing to an automatic public 
mobile telephone service using cellular technology that provides access to the 
public switched telephone network, per thousand people. 
 
27.  PERSONAL COMPUTERS 
This is the estimated number of self contained computers designed to be used 
by a single person, per thousand people. 
 
28.  INTERNET HOSTS 
These are computers connected directly to the worldwide network, many 
computer users can access the internet through a single host. 
  
  23 
REFERENCES 
 
BARNS D. W., J.A. EDMONDS & J.M. REILLY (1992) 
“Use of the Edmonds – Reilly Model Energy-related green 
house gas emissions”, OECD Economic Department 
Working Papers No. 113. 
 
CHICHILNISKY G. (1998a) “The knowledge revolution: Its impart on Consumption  
Patterns and resource use” in UNDP (ed) Background.  Paper: 
Human Development Reports.  New York: United Nations 
Development Program. 
 
CHICHILNISKY G. (1998b) “The knowledge Revolution”. The Journal of  
International Trade and Economic Development, 1:1, 39-54. 
 
GERMAN DEUTSCHLAND MAGAZINE No. 6/99, December/January 
 
K.J. MAYNARD (1980) The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. 
25-27, 
   London:  Macmillan 
 
MANNE A. (1992) “Global 2100: Alternative Scenario for Reducing Carbon 
Emissions”, 
   OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 111 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (1998) Computing Technology and Behavioural Research: 
All Integrated Approach, Cape coast: Quantitative Economic 
Research Bureau. 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (1998a) The Economics of year 2000 (Y2k) millennium bug: a 
useful  
Guide for computer system users and professionals Lagos 
Hot-Ice Production. 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (1999b) Information Technology in Africa.  Structure and Diffusion. 
A Paper presented at the twelfth World Congress of the 
International Economic Association, Benies Aires, Argentina 
South America (August 23-27) 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (1999c) Emission Policies and the Nigerian Economy: Simulations 
from  
The Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Model.  A paper 
presented at the Fourth Annual African Economic Conference, 
University of Witwatersand, Johannessburg, South Africa 
(July) 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (2000a) The knowledge Economic: Trends and Perspectives 
      Lagos: Quantitative Economic Research Bureau (forthcoming). 
 
  
  24 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (2000b) The Quantitative for a knowledge based economy: theory,  
Practice and prospects.  A paper proposed for the Millennium 
Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, Nicon Noga 
Hilton Hotel, Abuja (August 27
th – 1
st September, 2000). 
 
NWAOBI G.C. (2000c) Modern Econo (metric) Modeling for Developing 
Economies  
    Lagos: Quantitative Economic Research Bureau 
(forthcoming). 
 
OLIVEIRA MARTINS J., J.M. BURNIAUS, J.P. MARTIN, & G. NICOLETTI 
(1992) 
“The Costs of reducing CO2 Emissions: A comparison of 
Carbon tax curves with GREEN” OECD Economic 
Department Working Papers No. 118 
 
RUTHERFORD, T. (1992) “The Welfare Effects of Fossil Carbon Restrictions: 
Results  
From a Recursively Dynamic Trade Model, OECD Economic 
Department Working Papers No. 112 
 
TELL  (Nigerian) Magazine (Weekly) No. 28. July 10, 2000 
 
TIMES (International) Weekly Newsmagazine, Vol. 15b No.1 July 3, 2000 
 
UNDP (1999)   Human Development Report, 
      New York: Oxford University Press 
 
VOUYOUKAS L. (1992) Carbon taxes CO2 Emissions targets: Results from the IEA 
   Model”  OECD Economics Department Working Papers 
No.114 
 
WHALLEY J. & R. WIGLE (1992) “Results for the OECD Comparative Modeling  
Exercise from the Whalley – Wigle Model” OECD Economic 
Department Working Paper No. 121. 
 
WILLIAMSON J.G. (1997) “Globalization and Inequality: Past and Present World 
Bank 
   Research  Observer, Vol. 12, No. 2 
 
WORLD BANK (1999) World Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 